Adequacy of FDA's Response to Mad Cow Disease by Cantor, Alison E.
 
Adequacy of FDA's Response to Mad Cow Disease
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Adequacy of FDA's Response to Mad Cow Disease (1999 Third
Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:34:24 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8846787
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAAdequacy of FDA's Response to Mad Cow Disease
Alison Cantor
February 1, 1999
Food and Drug Law
1I. Introduction
The American public and the world know the problem as \Mad Cow Disease." The challenges that arise in
attempts to resolve this issue test the limits of science, government, and society. The somewhat aectionate
and comical name, Mad Cow Disease, belittles the severity of this problem, which now strikes fear into the
minds of the consuming public around the world. American consumers rest easy with the knowledge that
they are safe because there is no evidence of the disease here; however, they may be keeping themselves
blissfully ignorant. United States agencies inspire condence by continually emphasizing that there are no
cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), the scientic name for the disease, in the United States.1
However, the science does not preclude the possibility of it happening here. Actually, the most prevalent
scientic theories suggest that indeed it could occur here. The question is what measures the United States
needs to take in order to prevent such a development.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has attempted to regulate this area in order to insure that the
food supply of the United States remains safe for public consumption. However, given the uncertain state of
the scientic understanding of the disease, FDA found itself in the position of trying to make decisions about
the need for regulation (as well as its urgency and form) on the basis of very little conclusive information.
Inevitably, the question later arises as to whether the actions that the agency took were sucient and
whether the agency took action fast enough. The American public expects that FDA will take preventative
actions to protect their food supply, and they do not want to learn that this trust was misplaced from the
1See Petition Seeking Immediate Action by the FDA to Combat the Spread of Tramsmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy (TSE) in the United States, FDA Docket Number 99P-00033, (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://www.icta.org/legal/madcow1.htm> [hereinafter FDA Petition].
2deaths of innocent and unwitting consumers.2 FDA knew that if it took eective precautionary measures,
they would be criticized as unnecessary; however, if BSE is found in the United States, FDA knew that it
would face criticism for not having done enough and thus would encounter the dual challenge of eliminating
the disease from this country and working to regain the trust of the American people.3 This dilemma was
aptly expressed by a presenter at one of the open public forums discussing the proposed rule, \To FDA, I
say, pursue the science but be advised, no ready or easy answers await you. You have both my respect and
empathy."4 This paper will attempt to analyze the history of FDA's response to the emergence of BSE and
whether FDA's actions were adequate to protect the American public and its food supply.
II. Scientic Background and History of the Disease
One of the biggest problems with the quest to stop BSE or to prevent it from entering the United States
is the lack of scientic certainty about the subject. Unfortunately, waiting to nd some concrete answers
could take too long.5 So the problem is dealing with an unknown but concrete risk with only inconclusive
information when the theoretical risk could be extremely large with disastrous results.6
BSE is one of a type of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE's). TSE's are known to occur
2See FDA, Public Meeting for Consumers Regarding Federal Register 21 CFR Part 589 Substances Prohibited from Use in
Animal Food or Food; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, Feb. 13, 1997, p. 25 [hereinafter Public
Meeting 2].
3See Potential Transmission of Spongiform Encephalopathies to Humans: The Food and Drug Administration's [FDA]
Ruminant to Ruminant Feed Ban and the Safety of Other Products: Hearing Before the Comm. On Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 105th Cong. 107 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Hearing] (statement of William D. Hueston, DVM, Ph.D., Univ. of Md.).
4Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 38.
5See Food Safety: Oversight of the FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. On Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 158 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 Hearing 1] (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman of Subcommittee).
6See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman of Subcommittee).
3in humans, sheep, cows, deer and elk, mink, and can be transmitted experimentally to a number of other
animals.7 The TSE's in humans are kuru (found among the Fore people of New Guinea), Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease (CJD), Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker disease (GSS), and fatal familial insomnia (FFI).8
The mechanism behind these diseases is still not completely understood. The leading theory is that there
is an infectious protein involved, a prion. The prion theory is novel because it falls outside of the central
dogma of molecular biology. The normal prion protein exists naturally in many species; however, there is
a dierence in the conformation of the normal and infectious prion proteins.9 When the infectious prion
protein is introduced into a healthy animal, it is thought to induce the normal prion protein in that animal
to change form.10 The result is a prolonged illness aecting the central nervous system and during which
the brain of the victim becomes spongy in appearance.11 TSE's are always fatal and can have an incubation
period of years.12
The prion theory, though the leading theory, is not accepted by all scientists. It is extremely heretical because
it postulates a method of infection caused by an agent that does not carry DNA or RNA. Additionally, the
body produces no immunological response, and there are often no indications of the infection until clinical
signs arise.13 Scientists are still investigating other theories: a spiroplasma14 or a viral-like agent with nucleic
acid.15 Some of these scientists feel that the emphasis on the prion theory has prevented necessary debate
7See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United Kingdom: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting, 71 Bull. of the
World Health Org. 691, 691 (1993).
8See Stanley B. Prusiner, Biology and Genetics of Prion Diseases, 48 Ann. Rev. Microbiology 655, 655-56 (1994); Public
Health Issues Related to Animal and Human Spongiform Encephalopathies: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting, 70 Bull. of
the World Health Org. 183, 184 (1992).
9See Prusiner, supra note 8, at 660-61, 675.
10See id. at 656.
11See Public Health Issues Related to Animal and Human Spongiform Encephalopathies: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting,
70 Bull. of the World Health Org. 183 (1992)
12See id. at 183-84.
13See id. at 183.
14See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 109 (Frank Owen Bastion, M.D., Univ. of South Ala.).
15See Report of a WHO Consultation on Medicinal and other Products in Relation to Human and Animal Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies, WHO document WHO/EMC/ZOO/97.3 - WHO/BLG/97.2, Mar. 24-26, 1997, (last modied
Apr. 24, 1998), available in <http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/bse/tse 9703.html> [hereinafter WHO Report 1997].
4about the topic and misled the scientic community.16 Such a mistake could greatly hinder attempts to
prevent the disease from occurring, and then spreading, in the United States. Understanding the mechanism
of how this agent works is especially important because it is incredibly resistant to the usual methods of
inactivation.17 Thus, in order to prevent the spread of the disease, information about how the infectious
agent is transmitted and how to inactivate it is crucial.
BSE rst emerged (to our knowledge) in the United Kingdom, where scrapie (the TSE found in sheep)
is prevalent but has never before presented a problem. In the 1970s, the rendering process used to make
protein supplements for animal feed was changed to remove an extraction step.18 One theory to explain the
emergence of the disease is that the scrapie prion was thus able to survive the rendering process and initiated
the BSE epidemic through transmission in cattle feed.19 Many think that the process of recycling dead cows
(some of which could have had BSE), as well as sheep, into protein supplements for animal feed amplied
the epidemic by spreading the BSE agent to other cows through their feed.20 BSE was originally found in
the United Kingdom in 1986.21 On March 20, 1996, the British government announced that they had found
ten new and unusual cases of CJD in the United Kingdom.22 These cases were unusual because the victims
died at a much earlier age than is usual for CJD, the course of the disease was longer, and the lesions in the
brain were dierent.23 This type of CJD has come to be known as new variant CJD or nv-CJD.24 In Britain
there are now 34 people who have nv-CJD.25 In 1988, Britain took steps to prohibit this cycling of cattle
back into the cattle feed.26
16See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 109 (statement of Frank Owen Bastion, M.D., Univ. of South Ala.); Richard Rhodes,
Deadly Feasts 206 (1997).
17See WHO Report 1997, supra note 15, at 5.
18See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 106-108 (statement of Frederick Murphy, School of Veterinary Medicine, Univ. of
Calif., Davis).
19See id.
20See id.
21See id.
22See id.
23See id.
24See It is also called variant CJD (v-CJD).
25See Warren Leary, Keeping `Mad Cow' Away from U.S. Blood Supply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1999, at D1.
26See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 112 (statement of Frederick A. Murphy, Univ. of Cal., Davis).
5There is still debate about the cause of BSE. In 1988, scientists in the United Kingdom discovered an
epidemiological connection between BSE and the rendered ruminant27 products that are used in cattle
feed.28 However, epidemiological evidence may be less signicant because it is circumstantial, and it cannot
alone prove this link.29 Another theory suggests that there are naturally occurring, undetected, spontaneous
cases of BSE in a small percent of cattle.30 This latter theory suggests that even if no cattle containing BSE
are imported or introduced into this country, there is still the possibility that such a spontaneous case could
occur and that the disease could then be disseminated through the process of rendering cattle for animal
feed. There is also evidence of a causal link between BSE and nv-CJD; however, there is no conclusive
scientic proof of this fact.31
Another problem for controlling the disease is the lack of a diagnostic test. The complexity of the science
underlying this novel infectious agent compounds this problem. However, recently there have been indications
that some diagnostic tests are being developed using spinal uid32 or tonsil samples.33 Especially given the
long preclinical incubation period, a diagnostic test would greatly help in controlling and preventing the
spread of the disease.
On the basis of this inconclusive information, and in earlier years much less information than this, FDA
was attempting to determine what regulation was necessary in order to prevent, and if necessary control,
BSE within the United States. This problem was accentuated by the fact that many scientists dispute the
results of the epidemiological studies. There have been claims that England has been monopolizing tissue
27Ruminant animals are a suborder of mammals that chew their cud and have four stomachs. See Merriam Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary (Frederick C. Mish et al. Eds., 1997).
28See Food Safety: Oversight of the Centers for Disease Control Monitoring of Foodborne Pathogens, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong.
79-80 (1996) (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
29See Id. at 81; 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 159 (statement of Frederick A. Murphy, Univ. of Cal., Davis).
30See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 147 (statement of Robert Hahn, Public Voice for Food and Health Policy).
31See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 61-62 (statement of Lawrence B. Schonberger, M.D., CDC); Mad Cows and Englishmen:
the BSE scare, 338 Economist, Mar. 30, 1996, at 25.
32See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 99 (statement of Clarence J. Gibbs, Ph.D., NIH).
33See A.F. Hill et al., Investigation of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Other Human Prion Diseases With Tonsil
Biopsy Samples, 353 The Lancet 183 (1999).
6samples,34 that the research has been incompetent,35 that the methods of obtaining data are inadequate,36
and that there is a large amount of error in the clinical diagnosis of CJD.37 This was the background against
which FDA and other governmental agencies formulated their plan.
III. History of BSE-Related Regulation in the United States
A.
Regulation by Other Agencies
In addition to FDA, there are other agencies that are working to prevent the occurrence and spread of
BSE in the United States. While this paper will concentrate on FDA, the actions of that agency cannot be
understood without knowing some of the contributions that these other agencies were making to the eort.
In 1989, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibited the importation of British cattle.38
There were 499 cattle in the U.S. at that time that had been imported from Britain, and USDA quarantined
these animals.39 In 1990, USDA began surveillance measures for BSE that included examining the brains
of numerous cows that were suspected of having or showed signs indicating that they could have BSE.40
USDA also ordered an import alert in 1998 that extended the restriction on the importation of ruminants,
their meat and byproducts not only to countries where BSE is known to exist but also to countries which do
not have import requirements or surveillance measures that are as strict as those in the U.S. and, therefore,
34See The Other BSE Scandal, Economist, Feb. 22, 1997, at 61.
35See id.
36See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 118 (statement of Frank Owen Bastion, M.D., Univ. of South Ala.).
37See id.
38See Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 223 (1997). Given the lack of knowledge about the infectious agent and the fact that
many of the products being imported would be given to the same species, USDA decided to follow a no risk approach, even
though there was no evidence at the time implicating certain products. Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 31
39See Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 223 (1997). After the announcement of the possible link between BSE, and nv-CJD,
these 116 of these that were still alive at the time were killed. See id.
40See id.
7could present a risk to this country.41
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), part of USDA, also has restrictions on imports
and conducts surveillance for signs of BSE in the U.S.42 In addition, APHIS has prepared an emergency
response plan that would be implemented if BSE were found to exist in the U.S. and has procedures for
educating the public about the risks posed by BSE.43 APHIS also has a voluntary stock certication program
for sheep in order to encourage the eradication of scrapie from the United States.44
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) gathers and interprets information from surveillance
programs for CJD.45 The CDC is also trying to increase the sensitivity of the surveillance for nv-CJD by
starting a process of performing follow-up reviews for all patients under the age of 55 who are diagnosed
with CJD and by trying to increase the number of cases that are ocially reported.46
There is some concern that having multiple agencies working on this problem will lead to duplication, but
those involved seem to feel that this is not a concern and that the eort is collaborative.47 In April of 1996,
there was an interagency meeting between the CDC, National Institutes of Health (NIH), FDA, USDA, and
Department of Defense in order to distribute information about the conclusions reached at one of the World
Health Organization (WHO) meetings on the subject and to coordinate the eorts of the dierent agencies.48
41See USDA, Import Alert, IA #17-04, Detention Without Physical Examination of Bulk Shipments of High-Risk Bovine
Tissue from BSE Countries, Sept. 25, 1998.
42See Specied Oal from Adult Sheep and Goats Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 59 Fed. Reg. 44584, 44586 (1994) (proposed
Aug. 29, 1994). APHIS sent U.S. pathologists to the United Kingdom in order to teach them about BSE. 1997 Hearing, supra
note 3, at 44 (statement of Dr. Linda A. Detwiler, APHIS).
43See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 42 (statement of Dr. Linda A. Detwiler, APHIS).
44See Specied Oal from Adult Sheep and Goats Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 59 Fed. Reg. at 44586.
45See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 52-53 (statement of Lawrence B. Schonberger, M.D., CDC).
46See id. at 59.
47See id. at 90.
48See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 564 (1997) (to be codied at 21
C.F.R. pt. 589.2000) (proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
8B.
Regulation by FDA
The history of FDA's regulation in this area dates back to the 1980s because FDA became concerned about
the issue as soon as BSE was identied in 1986.49 The strategy of the food safety program promulgated by
FDA is inspectional, which makes it a reactive, instead of preventive, system in most instances.50 In the case
of BSE, FDA's nal strategy was to strengthen the voluntary industry ban on ruminant to ruminant feeding
by classifying ruminant protein added to ruminant food as not generally recognized as safe (not GRAS) and,
therefore, subject to control by FDA.51 However, this nal strategy, which actually was changed in the nal
rule to classify all mammalian protein in ruminant food as not GRAS, was the culmination of a history of
FDA involvement in this area that dates back to the rst identication of BSE.
Since the link between BSE and ruminant to ruminant feeding was rst suggested in 1988, FDA was a partic-
ipant in discussions, both nationally and internationally, attempting to understand the infectious agent and
the BSE epidemic.52 In 1989, when USDA's import restrictions were implemented, the National Renderers
Association (NRA) and the Animal Protein Producers Industry (APPI) recommended that its members
institute a voluntary ban on rendering adult sheep or providing such rendered material for cattle feed in
order to eliminate the possible link between the disease scrapie in sheep and BSE.53 In 1990, FDA increased
the stringency of its new drug application review process for human drug products that are derived from
bovine materials by requiring that the manufacturer document information about the source of the material
and slaughter of the animal in order to insure that the risk is minimal.54
49See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 95-96 (statement of Dr. Stephen Sundlof, CVM).
50See id. at 40-41 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
51See id. at 10.
52See id. at 56-57.
53See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 564; 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at
137-38 (statement of Don Franco, NRA).
54See FDA, BSE Fact Sheet: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Jan. 2, 1997, 3, (last
modied Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/infores/updates/bse/bsefact.html>.
9FDA also began writing letters to dierent segments of the industry suggesting that they take measures to
insure that any bovine products that they use are at a minimal risk of containing the BSE prion. These
letters represented FDA's maximum authority under the law in this area.55
FDA sent the rst letter on November 9, 1992, to the manufacturers of dietary supplements as the result
of an inconclusive investigation of a CJD victim who had taken a dietary supplement that contained bovine
materials.56 The letter requests that the manufacturers investigate the sources of any bovine or ovine ma-
terials that they use in their products to determine if they are produced in countries with BSE or from
ocks of sheep that have scrapie.57 The letter also recommended reformulating products to use ingredients
that are free of such contamination, requested gathering such information within two months, and suggested
developing plans (that would be communicated to FDA) to assure that their products are not supplied by
countries that have BSE.58 FDA sent a letter on December 17, 1993, to the manufacturers of drugs, biolog-
ical drugs, medical devices, and biological device products requesting that bovine materials not be used in
the manufacture of products that are intended for use by humans and regulated by FDA if these materials
originated in countries that have BSE.59 USDA maintains a list of such countries.60 FDA also sent two
letters on August 17, 1994. One letter was to the manufacturers of FDA-regulated products for animals; it
stated that they should not use materials derived from cattle that originated from or resided in a country
containing BSE for manufacturing products regulated by FDA that were intended for use in the drugs or
feed of animals.61 The other was a second letter to the manufacturers and importers of dietary supplements
reiterating and extending FDA's earlier warning that bovine tissues, and extracts derived from such tissues,
55See FDA, Public Forum on the Proposed Rule 21 CFR 589: Substances Prohibited from use in Animal Food or Feed, Feb.
4, 1997, 9 [hereinafter Public Meeting 1].
56See Agency Letters to Manufacturers of FDA-Regulated Products, 59 Fed. Reg. 44591, 44591-92 (1994) (notice of Aug.
29, 1994).
57See id.
58See id.
59See id. at 44592.
60See id. at 44591.
61See id. at 44593.
10should not come from cattle that have been in countries where BSE occurs.62 This letter extended these
recommendations to manufacturers of cosmetic products as well.63 These letters also provided recommen-
dations for the implementation of these requests.
FDA conducted a survey of the rendering practices used for sheep in 1992 and found that the industry was
not fully implementing the voluntary ban and that ovine materials were still making their way into cattle and
other animal feed.64 As a result, on August 29, 1994, FDA issued a proposed rule that would declare that
specied oal from adult sheep and goats is not GRAS for use in ruminant food and, therefore, would be
an unapproved food additive.65 This proposed rule was based on studies indicating the connection between
feeding calves food containing material derived from sheep infected with scrapie and BSE, and it was aimed
at preventing an outbreak of BSE in the U.S.66 FDA did consider banning the use of ruminant tissue in
ruminant feed; however, they decided that such a ban was not warranted at this time and that they would
reconsider this decision if surveillance measures indicated the presence of BSE in the United States.67 The
industry contested this rule,68 and FDA never progressed toward implementing it.69 FDA evaluated all of the
comments and later considered this option again when initiating an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) in 1996 | after the United Kingdom announced the possible link between BSE and nv-CJD.70
In 1996, the industry also announced a voluntary ban on ruminant to ruminant feeding; however, there was
no survey to determine how well the industry implemented this ban.71 FDA also sent a letter on May 9,
62See id. at 44593-94.
63See id. FDA did not extend this restriction to materials derived from sheep. See id.
64See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30939 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589); Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 223 (1997).
65See Update on BSE, 11 FDA Veterinarian 5, (July/Aug. 1996) <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/infores/fdavet/1996/796fdavet.html>;
Specied Oal from Adult Sheep and Goats Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 59 Fed. Reg. 44584, 44584 (1994) (proposed Aug.
29, 1994).
66See id.
67See id. at 44588.
68See Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 223 (1997).
69See Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, Mad Cow U.S.A. 159-163 (1997).
70See Protein Derived from Ruminants Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 61 Fed. Reg. 24253, 24253 (1996) (to be codied at
21 C.F.R. pt. 589) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking May 14, 1996); Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 223-24 (1997).
71See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 564 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589.2000)
(proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
111996, to the manufacturers of products regulated by FDA in order to restate their concerns about BSE and
recommend that the manufacturers take measures to assure themselves that any bovine products that they
use are not from cattle that were born, killed, or raised in a country known to have BSE.72 Additionally,
FDA and USDA hosted a symposium on the issue of TSE's in order to facilitate discussion of the issue.73
FDA also formed an intra-agency working group as well as a CJD Advisory Committee, which was formed
in 1995 and rechartered in 1996 as the TSE Advisory Committee.74 Recently, FDA has proposed requiring
that the manufacturers of certain products that contain cellular and tissue-based material register with FDA,
listing the ingredients of such products, and that human dura mater be regulated as well.75 These actions all
lead up to FDA's nal rule and the question of whether such action was sucient to protect the American
public.
C.
The Rule
On May 14, 1996, FDA issued an ANPRM to solicit comments about the possibility of banning protein
derived from ruminants being used in ruminant feed.76 The ANPRM was made only two months after the
United Kingdom announced the possible link between BSE and nv-CJD. This notice was issued against the
background of a WHO meeting in April that concluded that there was circumstantial evidence suggesting
a link between these two diseases and recommending that all countries ban the use of ruminant material in
ruminant feed.77
72See Update on BSE, 11 FDA Veterinarian 5, (July/Aug. 1996) <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/infores/fdavet/1996/796fdavet.html>.
73See id.
74See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
75See Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 62 Fed. Reg.
26744, (1998) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 1271) (proposed May 14, 1998).
76See Protein Derived from Ruminants Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 61 Fed. Reg. 24253 (1996) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 589) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking May 14, 1996).
77See Protein Derived From Ruminants Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 61 Fed. Reg. 24253, 24253-54 (advance notice of
12On January 3, 1997, FDA issued the proposed rule, which generally declares that ruminant and mink protein
is not GRAS when added to food for ruminant animals, requires cautionary labeling on such products, and
mandates the maintenance of records in order for FDA to assess compliance.78 The proposed ban was
stronger than the previously proposed rule from 1994, which FDA did not act upon because of opposition
from the industry and the lack of sucient inspectors to enforce the rule.79 FDA designed this rule in order
to decrease the risk of an adverse eect on an individual or population if an epidemic of BSE were to occur
in the United States and results show that there is a relationship between BSE and nv-CJD.80 The proposed
rule would have prevented using ruminant tissue as a food additive until there is scientic data proving to
FDA that it is safe.81 The proposed rule also suggested several alternatives for consideration.82 Reactions
to this rule varied. FDA held two open forums for discussion of the rule, and reactions ranged from feeling
that the agency was going too far to feeling that it was not doing enough.83 However, in order to make the
safest decision, even if it is later shown to be excessive, the rule needed to be imposed at that time.84
On April 17, 1997, FDA announced the availability of a draft rule, which changed the ban to exclude all
mammalian tissues from ruminant feed and allowed for a period of comment on the draft.85 The nal rule
was published on June 5, 1997 and generally went into eect on August 4, 1997.86 The nal rule declared that
\protein derived from mammalian tissues for use in ruminant feed is a food additive.... The use or intended
use in ruminant feed of any material that contains protein derived from mammalian tissues causes the feed to
proposed rulemaking May 14, 1996). The WHO also had made this suggestion earlier, though. See discussion infra Part V.C.
78See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 570 (1997) (to be codied at 21
C.F.R. pt. 589.2000) (proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
79See Lawrence K. Altman, Cow Disease Sparks Voluntary Rules on Feed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1996, x1, at 10.
80See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 561.
81See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 12-13 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
82See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 589.2000) (proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
83See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2; Public Meeting 1, supra note 55.
84See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 123 (statement of Dr. Frederick A. Murphy, Univ. of Cal., Davis).
85See Animal Proteins in Ruminant Feed; Draft Rule; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 18728, 18728 (1997) (draft available Apr.
17, 1997).
86See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R. 589).
13be adulterated and in violation of the act..."87 Mammalian tissues are limited by the rule to proteinaceous
material, but the rule excludes blood, gelatin, cooked foods that have previously been oered as human
food and have subsequently been further heat processed, milk, and mammalian protein derived solely from
pigs or horses.88 Although specic requirements and exemptions are described in the rule, it also generally
institutes labeling requirements and recordkeeping requirements of one year.89 Although some comments
suggest that this rule institutes more stringent requirements that the scientic evidence may suggest, it is
more practical and enforceable, which increases that chance that the industry will comply with the rule.90
The nal rule acknowledges that recognition of GRAS status cannot be based on the absence of evidence
that a substance is dangerous and puts the burden of proving safety on the industry, because FDA does
not think that this matter can be delayed while scientists conduct further research.91 \FDA believes that
the rule selected is the most cost-eective regulatory alternative that meets the objective of the agency."92
Thus, 11 years after the rst recognition of BSE, FDA had completed a regulation to prevent the spread of
the disease in the United States. The question inevitably arises whether FDA did too much, did enough,
and did it quickly enough.
IV. Problems with Action
A.
Should FDA have acted at all? Did FDA do too much?
87Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 21 C.F.R. 589.2000(b); Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final
Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. at 30977.
88See id. at 30976-77.
89See id. at 30976-78.
90See id. at 30943.
91See id. at 30948-49.
92Id. at 30974.
14There were a number of people who thought that FDA should not impose a ban on feeding ruminant protein
to ruminant animals. One of the foremost reasons for this assertion was the idea that such decisions should
be based on science.93 At a Congressional Hearing in 1996, Dr. Franco, a member of the NRA, asked that
we err on the side of science and not on the side of safety because the risk factors in the U.S. are not the
same as those in the United Kingdom.94 He said that the industry was in favor of evaluating regulatory
options on the basis of science instead of public opinion or politics, and that the ban is unnecessary if there
is no evidence that BSE exists in U.S. cattle.95
FDA explicitly considered a no action alternative and found that such an option was supported merely by
the lack of evidence documenting an immediate threat to the public health and by other data suggesting
that any risk was minimal.96 Evidence suggesting that there is no direct threat included the continually
reiterated fact that there are no cases of BSE in the United States, that evidence cannot conclusively prove
that the perpetuation of the disease results from the spread of the infectious agent through animal feed,
that there is no direct proof of the link between BSE and nv-CJD, and that the WHO has stated that other
countries are not at as great a risk as the United Kingdom.97 Others also commented that designating such
protein as not GRAS would stigmatize the products in a way that the available scientic information did not
warrant.98 FDA had to balance these issues, which mainly relate to the uncertainty of the science, against
the demands of those who felt that action was necessary.
There were numerous other voices arguing that action was imperative. At a Congressional hearing in 1996,
Representative Shays said in his opening speech that \Rather than provide a pretext for inaction, the lack of
hard proof should compel government and industry to aggressive safety measures that meet every probable,
93See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 37.
94See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 154-55 (Don Franco, NRA).
95See id. at 133.
96See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 553 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589.2000)
(proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
97See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 553-54 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt.
589.2000) (proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
98See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 39.
15possible, or even theoretical threat."99 The experiences that our country has had with Hepatitis and AIDS
suggest that new infectious agents can avoid detection by our defenses unless we are extremely alert to the
possibilities, theoretical and actual, that it will occur in the United States.100 Even a member of the National
Cattlemen's and Beef Association has said that we cannot be wrong, which is the reason that we are taking
such an incredible preventative step.101 Proponents of action point to the fact that the rendering techniques
in the United States may not totally eliminate the infectious agent, so given that scrapie and other TSE's
occur in this country, the possibility does exist that BSE could spread here if we do not have restrictions on
animal feeding practices.102 FDA stated that the cost in human and animal lives (as well as economic costs)
that could result if a BSE epidemic occurred in the United States warrants taking the actions proposed by
the rule.103 The CDC, USDA, and WHO all recommended or supported a ruminant to ruminant feeding
ban, and such a ban would greatly help to alleviate public concern.104 Other reasons for action included the
fact that our border is not completely sealed and that the risk of amplifying BSE could be greater in the
United States.105 Some proponents of action even requested an interim or temporary ban while the nal
rule was being prepared.106
This decision came down to balancing the uncertainties of science against theoretical risks. It has been
suggested that risk assessment and risk management should be performed by dierent groups in order to
prevent biasing the risk assessment by ideas about what action one thinks is necessary.107 In this case, it
seems that although the scientic determinations were not conclusive, there was enough suggestive evidence
991996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, chairman of subcommittee).
100See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, chairman of subcommittee).
101See Lawrence K. Altman, Cow Disease Sparks Voluntary Rules on Feed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1996, x1, at 10.
102See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 24 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
103See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 554 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589.2000)
(proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
104See id.
105See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 143 (Statement of Robert Hahn, Public Voice for Food and Health Policy).
106See id.
107See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 210 (1995).
16to warrant action on the part of FDA. The risks of inaction were too large. Although assessments of the sit-
uation ranged from complete faith in the current system to apocalyptic predictions, even the circumstantial
evidence alone could not be ignored. Action was necessary.
B.
Speed
Although there are the inevitable criticisms that FDA did not work quickly enough, a number of those
involved asked for more time to consider the rule and the alternative proposals. FDA declined to allow
additional time for comment on the nal rule.108 Members of the NRA and the APPI wrote to FDA asking
them to extend the comment period by 90 days.109 Their reasons included the complexity and number of
issues involved, the fact that FDA requested detailed opinions on six dierent alternative proposals which
could not be responded to in the time provided, the fact that the lengthy, substantive documents require
time to analyze, and the time necessary to provide meaningful comments.110 Some appealed to the idea
of cooperating to create a rule that would meet everyone's goals by allowing more time for comment.111
Others suggested that FDA issue a compliance policy guideline which would allow more time for resolving
some of the questions that are involved before they issued a rule.112 Other options included an interim rule;
however, this is an exception to the Administrative Procedure Act that is only allowed if the procedures
are impracticable, against the public interest, or not necessary.113 Despite all of these requests to slow the
108See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30962 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
109See Public Meeting 1, supra note 55, at 70.
110See Public Meeting 1, supra note 55, at 70-71; Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 44.
111See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 35.
112See Public Meeting 1, supra note 55, at 66.
113See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30950 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
17process down and allow time for more discussion, there were a number of people complaining about the
length of time that it took to promulgate a rule on the issue.
One member of FDA admitted before a Congressional committee that FDA could have acted sooner. When
being asked why FDA did not take action a year ago, Dr. Friedman was forced to admit that there was no
practical reason why they could not have done so.114 He also had to explain that the reason that they started
acting in 1996, when the WHO had made such a recommendation in 1991, was their analysis indicating that
the factors aecting the risk in the United States were dierent from those present in the United Kingdom.115
The Congressional Hearing also required that FDA explain why it was not taking emergency rulemaking
procedures or invoking a temporary ban.116 Despite reassurance that FDA would \expedite regulations,"117
there are many who felt that the pace was still too slow, that the issue was being discussed too much before
implementation,118 and that the government's actions were \shamefully inadequate" when the period during
which prevention was possible may have been elapsing.119 FDA stated that it made the draft rule available,
thus lengthening the amount of time before the nal rule was implemented, because of the complexity of
the issues involved.120 However, the agency did decline to extend the eective date for the statute, although
it allowed an extra sixty days to use up current supplies.121 Thus, the numerous perspectives on this issue
make it dicult to assess whether FDA was adequately performing its job of protecting the American food
supply. In order to make a more thorough assessment of this question, it is necessary to compare FDA's
actions against some of the available standards.
114See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 99 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
115See id. at 99-100.
116See id. at 144, 153.
117See Lawrence K. Altman, Cow Disease Sparks Voluntary Rules on Feed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1996, x1, at 10.
118See Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, Mad Cow U.S.A. 211 (1997).
119See Press Release, International Center for Technology Assessment (Jan. 7, 1999)
<http://www.icta.org/ctanews/madcow.htm>.
120See Animal Proteins in Ruminant Feed; Draft Rule; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 18728, 18728 (1997) (draft available Apr.
17, 1997).
121See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30960 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
18V. Enough and Fast Enough?
A.
Comparison with Institute of Medicine (IOM) HIV recommendations
In a 1997 Congressional Hearing, it was suggested that the recommendations and comments made in the
1995 report of the IOM pertaining to HIV could serve as a framework for evaluating FDA's actions concern-
ing the possibility of transmitting CJD through the blood supply.122 This report suggested that FDA had
missed opportunities for action by choosing the least aggressive alternatives, often due to uncertainty about
the science, and that a more systematic approach should be used in similar situations.123 In his statement
for a Congressional Hearing, Dr. Friedman said that FDA had learned from its experience with HIV and
responded to the threat that these types of infectious agents pose to the blood supply in the United States.124
FDA is the main regulatory agency that is responsible for blood and blood products in this country and
generally bases decisions relating to the blood supply on scientic consensus.125 The inability of the system
to deal with a problem which is surrounded by uncertainties of science was evidenced by the result of the
episode with HIV.126 The 1995 report lists CJD as one of the other possible infectious agents that could pose
a threat to the blood supply.127 The report made six recommendations that applied to FDA. I will consider
whether FDA has implemented each of three of these suggestions.128
122See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 38 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
123See id.
124See id. at 39.
125See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 7 (1995).
126See id. at 2.
127See id. at 130.
128The recommendations that pertained to FDA were numbers 6 through 11. The last three recommendations relate to the
system of advisory committees that FDA has to help it evaluate decisions. Recommendation #9 asked for balance in the
composition of the committee advising FDA about blood products in order to make sure that there are both members who are
involved in the industry and who are independent. Recommendation #10 suggested that FDA make its expectations clear to
its advisory committees and also that it perform an independent review of these committees. Recommendation #11 stated that
FDA needs reliable information about the blood supply and should be able to analyze the information and assess regulatory
decisions on its own. See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of
19There is no conclusive evidence that CJD can be transmitted through blood. However, it has been shown
that injection of a certain component of blood from patients with CJD into rodents can transmit the dis-
ease.129 The infectious agent can occasionally be found in blood at low titers, but epidemiological data
suggest that if the infectious agent is present in the blood, the risk must be very low.130 The WHO also
considers these products to be safe.131 However, any risk, even if minimal, obviously generates great concern
because people with CJD can donate blood and not know that they have the disease.
Recommendation #6 suggested that when uncertainties prevent complete elimination of a risk, FDA should
promote partial solutions, as long as they do not cause harm.132 Examples of such actions could include
destroying unscreened blood, phased recall of such blood, and \lookback" procedures to notify those who
received infected blood.133 FDA's actions in this area actually predate these recommendations in some cases;
however, FDA has recently attempted to institute partial solutions that seem aimed at eliminating some
of the risk, if all risk cannot be eliminated. In 1987, an FDA letter recommended deferral of donors who
had been the recipients of human pituitary-derived growth hormone; however, this recommendation did not
institute \lookback" procedures for those who later developed CJD.134 FDA has since suggested that blood
products from donors who have a greater risk of developing CJD should be quarantined and destroyed.135 In
1993, FDA instituted more complete reporting in order to identify safety concerns.136 In 1994, blood product
manufacturers quarantined derivatives of such identied blood, and in 1995, FDA instituted an interim pol-
Medicine, HIV ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 15 (1995). Because
this paper is focusing on whether the actions that FDA took are sucient, it will not assess possible areas, such as problems in
advisory committees, that could have led to such wrong decisions.
129See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., FDA).
130See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 64 (statement of Lawrence B. Schonberger, M.D., CDC).
131See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 561 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589.2000)
(proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
132See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 14 (1995).
133See id. at 227.
134See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Letter about Revised Precautionary Measures to Reduce the Possible
Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) by Blood and Blood Products, Dec. 11, 1996, at 2.
135See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 35 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
136See id. at 30 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
20icy of withdrawing all blood products from donors who were later diagnosed with CJD.137 To insure safety,
there was a provision for release of this blood, with a special label, in the event of a documented shortage.138
Another example of such partial solutions is that FDA made an exception for pools of plasma derivatives
when one donor had only one known family member with CJD.139 These were all partial solutions to try
to respond to the fact that there is some, but inconclusive, evidence that blood can transmit CJD. Because
there is no way of determining whether the blood contains the infectious agent, FDA instituted these other
methods in order to reduce the risk.
Recommendation #7 acknowledged the fact that the amount of knowledge that we have is changing and
suggested that FDA periodically review key decisions that it has made regarding the blood supply and eval-
uate them in the light of new information.140 It appears that in this area, especially recently, FDA is making
an eort to revise its policies. At the end of 1996, FDA revised its policy to stress the importance of both
deferring donors who are at increased risk and investigating the family history of CJD in donors.141 More
recently, in 1999, a scientic advisory panel suggested that FDA consider barring blood donations from those
people who have visited Great Britain since 1980, and FDA's advisory committee decided to consider this
issue.142 These decisions all show an eort to reevaluate previous decisions in the light of new information.
These recommendations can also be applied to other areas of FDA regulation. In the realm of protecting the
animal and public health from BSE, there were options that FDA could have considered which would have
been partial solutions during the period of debate about whether to institute a full ruminant to ruminant or
mammalian to ruminant feeding ban. One of those options could have been to act on the 1994 proposed rule
regarding specied oal from sheep and goats. Such a ban could have been a partial solution in the light
137See id. at 31-32 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
138See id.
139See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Letter about Revised Precautionary Measures to Reduce the Possible
Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) by Blood and Blood Products, Dec. 11, 1996, at 8.
140See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 14 (1995).
141See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
142See Warren Leary, Keeping `Mad Cow' Away from U.S. Blood Supply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1999, at D1.
21of the theories about BSE that existed at the time. This decision could then have been later reevaluated in
the light of new knowledge about the transmission of BSE, and the full mammalian to ruminant ban could
then have been implemented. Thus, although FDA seems to have implemented these two recommendations
to a signicant degree in their handling of the blood supply, they did not carry these lessons over into other
areas of regulation.143
Recommendation #8 pleaded for clarity in requests to regulated organizations both as pertaining to the
requirements desired and whether compliance is mandatory.144 FDA seems to have achieved this by stating
in its letters that plans for compliance should be submitted to FDA within a certain period of time.145 The
organizations are sometimes also required to submit the dates on which such changes were established and
implemented.146 However, in its nal rule relating to animal feed, FDA did not specify specic procedures
for cleaning out the machinery. This fact has put a great burden on each feed mill operator to develop
a process that is sucient and then to prove this fact to the inspector.147 So once again, FDA has not
necessarily carried these lessons from dealing with the blood supply over to other areas of regulation.
FDA seems to have attempted to implement these recommendations, especially in the regulation of the
blood supply. One area in which FDA has also excelled is in implementing education programs to promote
compliance with the rule.148 The IOM report emphasized the importance of risk communication.149 FDA
has tried to increase the public availability of information regarding recalls and withdrawals and has tried
143FDA has revised decisions in light of new scientic information in areas other than blood products, though. One example
of this is gelatin. See discussion infra Part V.D.2.
144See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 14-15 (1995).
145See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Letter about Revised Precautionary Measures to Reduce the Possible
Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) by Blood and Blood Products, Dec. 11, 1996, at 9.
146See id.
147See Jon F. Scheid, Successful BSE Teleconference Held for Feed Industry, 8 FDA Veterinarian 5 (Sept./Oct. 1998)
<http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/infores/fdavet/1998/SEPT1.htm>.
148See CVM, FDA, Enforcement Strategy Update: FDA Regulation 21 CFR 589.2000 The BSE Feed Regulation, at 16-18
(December 1998) <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/TOCs/strat.PDF> [hereinafter Enforcement Strategy Update].
149See Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, Institute of Medicine, HIV
ant the Blood Supply (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Michael A. Stoto eds.) 211-12 (1995).
22to increase the amount of input that the public has in this area.150 Although not directly related to the
blood supply, FDA has tried to educate those involved in the industry about the threat that BSE poses.
As will be elaborated on in the next section, FDA is trying to discuss the problem and the solutions with
those involved. Thus, FDA seems to have implemented these recommendations when dealing with the blood
supply, but it has not necessarily carried these lessons over into its other areas of regulation.
B.
Enforcement Update
Another method of gauging whether FDA took enough action is to analyze the enforcement strategy goals
for the regulation and whether or not they have been achieved. This process will determine what the current
situation is in order to assess whether the nal rule is actually having its desired eect.
The main objective of the original enforcement strategy was to achieve 100% actual compliance, not just
compliance with the recordkeeping requirements of the rule.151 The agency set goals for inspection and
education for the rst two years, which aimed at inspecting all of the rms that were aected by the rule
and a group of the producers.152 The implementation of these goals also involved tracing shipments of
animal feed backwards and forwards through the system of distribution in order to determine the degree of
compliance of all involved in the process.153 The inspections were aimed at educating the members of the
industry, attaining compliance without resorting to enforcement actions, using enforcement actions when
necessary, and gathering information in order to plan future strategies.154 The educational strategy involved
using both general and individual teaching to conduct education programs that reach a signicant number
150See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
151See Enforcement Strategy Update, supra note 148, at 8.
152See id.
153See id. at 9.
154See id.
23of those whom the rule aects and that are eective.155 FDA has stated that inspections will be performed
by FDA as well as state personnel and that they will follow through with enforcement actions if there are
knowing, willful, or egregious violations of the rule.156 However, FDA views the inspection as the rst chance
to educate the violator about a problem and obtain a promise to correct the violation.157 Often a warning
will be sent out; however, the agency is prepared to use its other remedial options (seizure, injunction and
prosecution) if they are necessary.158
FDA's enforcement actions in the rst year of implementation determined that overall compliance rates
(percentage with no violations) ranged from 85% for renderers to 48% for unlicensed feed mills; however,
compliance rates for each of the individual requirements were much higher.159 Inspectors found no cases in
which enforcement actions for egregious violations were necessary. Education about the rule is being pro-
mulgated through Small Entity Compliance Guides, the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) home page,
distribution of educational materials, and presentations at numerous meetings.160 A pilot study showed that
overall awareness of the regulation was at 96%.161
Enforcement of the rule can be dicult because BSE has not been found in the United States and there
are neither tests to determine if the infectious agent is present before the animal shows clinical signs of the
disease nor to determine the species of the material in the animal feed. As a result, enforcement generally
depends on following the paper trail for the shipment.162 In terms of assaying for BSE, we are the only
country in the world that is consistently performing two methods of diagnosis on all cattle analyzed.163
In mid-1998, almost 1000 inspections had been performed, and the percentage of rms in compliance had
155See id. at 9-10.
156See CVM, A Report on the Questions Asked and Answered on the Air During the June 24 BSE Satellite Teleconference
30, 17 <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/TOCs/bsetrans.html>.
157See id. at 17.
158See id.
159See Enforcement Strategy Update, supra note 148, at 11-13.
160See id. at 17.
161See id.
162See id. at 3.
163See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 19-20.
24increased, as had awareness of the statute.164 However, despite all of these encouraging statements and
evidence of compliance, there are some areas of concern.
A pilot program in Nebraska indicated that although the rate of overall compliance was good, there were
problems with the cautionary labeling requirements; however, the NRA addressed these problems in a letter
that it sent to all rendering facilities.165 Additional concerns that this pilot program raised included the fact
that jobbers (who gather animal material for selling at a prot) do not use invoices, sell to anyone, and can
be dicult to identify; there could be cross-contamination through the trucks that are used to ship the feed;
some lack of inspection of renderers by USDA; and the need for standardized clean out procedures.166
Thus, the enforcement program appears to be achieving good results and addressing new problems as they
arise. If this trend continues, hopefully they will be able to achieve their goal of 100% compliance. There
does not seem to be a cause for concern that FDA is not doing its utmost to implement its regulation.
C.
WHO Guidelines
One way of gauging whether FDA acted quickly enough or should have taken more stringent measures at an
earlier date is to compare FDA's actions with the recommendations of the WHO. The WHO has held seven
meetings or consultations167 on the topic of TSE's and made recommendations as to actions that countries
should take.
The rst WHO meeting on TSE's was held on November 12-14, 1991. At this time FDA's only actions
164See CVM, A Report on the Questions Asked and Answered on the Air During the June 24 BSE Satellite Teleconference
16 <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/TOCs/bsetrans.html>.
165See Enforcement Strategy Update, supra note 148, at attachment H 3
166See id. at attachment H 6.
167Information from the 1991 and 1993 meetings is taken from memorandums printed in the Bulletin of the World Health
Organization. Information about the two 1996 meetings and the 1997 meeting is taken from the reports or excerpts of the
report from those meetings that were available on the web. I was unable to obtain a copy or summary of the report from the
1995 meeting or the 1998 meeting.
25had been an increase in the stringency of review of new drug applications that involved bovine materials.
There were also the USDA importation prohibition and a voluntary ban by the sheep rendering industry
that were in place at this time.168 The WHO report suggested that the change in rendering practices was
an important factor in the emergence of BSE and stated that the disease can be transmitted orally in ex-
perimental settings.169 The report also discussed the fact that the species barrier is unpredictable and that
exposure due to occupation and medical products should be considered.170 The report did state that there
is no evidence supporting the theory that scrapie causes CJD, but it acknowledged that because one cannot
necessarily assume that the same applies to BSE, it is necessary to take steps to reduce risk and prevent
transmission.171 The WHO report listed categories of infectivity for dierent types of tissue in which brain
and spinal cord ranked highest for infectivity.172 The report said that studies suggest that contamination
of feed is the cause of the disease and can amplify the problem by recycling cattle.173 It recommended that
countries without a current BSE presence should create surveillance programs to detect any cases if they
should arise, and if risk factors, such as feeding ruminant protein to ruminant animals, scrapie, etc., are
present, they should consider banning specied oals, which contain greater amounts of the infectious agent,
from ruminant feed.174 This recommendation was made three years before FDA even proposed banning
specied oals from sheep | a proposal that was never acted upon | although there was a voluntary ban
in place by sheep renderers and FDA considered conditions in the United States to be dierent from those
in Great Britain.175 The WHO report also said that to minimize risk to humans, specied oals should not
be used in food for animals or humans and that muscle, milk, tallow, and some other specied tissues do
168See discussion infra Part III.B.
169See Public Health Issues Related to Animal and Human Spongiform Encephalopathies: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting,
70 Bull. of the World Health Org. 183, 184 (1992).
170See id. at 185.
171See id. at 185-86.
172See id. at 186.
173See id. at 187.
174See id.
175See discussion supra Part III.B.; 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 99-100.
26not appear to pose a risk to health.176 It also recommended carefully selecting the source of materials for
ingredients in medical products and cosmetics, including the type of material, the conditions of collection,
the amount of material, the method used to administer the material, and any procedures used to decrease
its infectivity.177 FDA advocated such attention to source materials in its four letters, the rst of which was
issued in 1992 and the last of which were issued in 1994. Thus, at least initially, the actions taken by FDA
seem to lag behind the WHO recommendations to reduce the risk of BSE.
The WHO had another consultation about BSE on May 7, 1993, which discussed new scientic information
which had become available since the previous meeting and stated that there were indications that the feed
ban was having a positive eect.178 At this time, FDA had sent out the rst two of its letters suggesting
careful selection of source materials and was conducting its survey of sheep rendering practices to assess the
eectiveness of the voluntary ban. This report recommended that although the list of specied oals was not
being expanded, these materials \should not enter the human or animal food chains," giving reference to the
memorandum from the 1991 meeting, and stated that evidence increasingly indicated that the infectivity of
BSE may be most signicant in central nervous system tissue. 179 The report stated that because there was
no known case of a naturally occurring TSE in pigs, these animals represent a negligible risk.180 The report
also stated that evidence did not suggest an increase in the number of cases of CJD which could be attributed
to the BSE epidemic and referred readers to the 1992 meeting summary for information about reducing risks
to humans.181 Although FDA was still a little slow at this time in implementing the recommendations from
the 1991 meeting, they had begun to advise manufacturers to be careful about the source of their materials
and to evaluate the eectiveness of the voluntary ban by sheep renderers. However, with the announcement
176See Public Health Issues Related to Animal and Human Spongiform Encephalopathies: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting,
70 Bull. of the World Health Org. 183, 187-88 (1992).
177See id. at 188-90.
178See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United Kingdom: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting, 71 Bull. of the
World Health Org. 691, 691-94 (1993).
179Id. at 692-94.
180See id.
181See id.
27in 1996 of the possible link between BSE and nv-CJD, pressure to act would soon increase.
In the years between the 1993 meeting and the 1996 announcement, FDA did move to increase eorts to
insure the proper sourcing of materials and to propose a ban on using specied sheep oal in ruminant feed.
The WHO meeting on April 2-3, 1996, the month after the announcement, set forth some new recommenda-
tions. Among these recommendations included the statement that \No part or product of any animal which
has shown signs of a TSE should enter any food chain (human or animal)," which meant killing and safely
disposing of such animals, reviewing rendering procedures to ascertain how eectively they inactivate the
infectious agent, and creating a system of surveillance and notication in order to determine the presence
of BSE in the country.182 Although the report stated that milk, gelatin (if properly manufactured), and
tallow (if appropriate rendering practices are used) are safe, it restated the importance of obtaining bovine
materials for use in medical products only from countries without BSE and declared that \[a]ll countries
should ban the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed."183 The United States began to take this nal step;
however, as mentioned previously, the WHO had recommended such a step, at least for specied oals, in
1991, and such a rule was not nalized in the U.S. until 1997.
The WHO held a second meeting in 1996 on May 14-16, in which it focused on nv-CJD. This report an-
nounced the possibility of a diagnostic test that uses cerebrospinal uid and was still being researched.184
The report from this meeting discussed the clinical signs of nv-CJD and stated that a link between BSE and
nv-CJD had not been proven.185 Other subjects that the experts discussed were the surveillance system for
CJD and other TSE's and the further research that was necessary.186 Thus, this meeting did not result in
182Report of a WHO Consultation on Public Health Issues Related to Human and Animal Transmissible Spongi-
form Encephalopathies, WHO document, Apr. 2-3, 1996,at 2-3 (last modied Apr. 24, 1998), available in
<http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/bse/bsecjd.html#a1>.
183Id. at 3-5.
184See Excerpts from Report of a WHO Consultation on Clinical and Neuropathological Characteristics of the New Variant
of CJD and Other Human and Animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies, WHO document, May 14-16, 1996, at 4
(last modied Apr. 24, 1998), available in <http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/bse/may14rep.html>.
185See id. at 7-8.
186See id. at 8-13.
28any further recommendations; however, the fact that there was a second meeting served to reemphasize the
importance and signicance of this problem.
The WHO held another consultation on the subject of TSE's on March 24-26, 1997, just a few months
before FDA announced the nal rule regarding mammalian to ruminant feeding in the United States. This
report covered many of the same topics as the previous ones and added some details about how specic
measures were to be performed or what factors should be considered in making assessments.187 The WHO
recognized that there is still debate about the nature of the infectious agent that is causing these TSE's
and that a causal relationship between BSE and nv-CJD has not been proven.188 The report recommended
that manufacturers avoid using bovine materials, and materials from other animals with naturally occurring
TSE's, in medicinal products and suggested that when this is not possible, manufacturers should carefully
select source materials by taking into account numerous factors that could aect their possible contamination
with BSE.189 Other issues covered in this report include the risk of transmission from medical instruments,
pituitary hormones, and dura mater used in medical procedures, the risk of transmission from blood, the
risk of BSE in sheep, and the risk from food products derived from ruminants.190 The report expressed
some concern about the possible transmission of nv-CJD through blood and recommended excluding donors
who have a familial history of these diseases, had received treatments derived from human pituitary glands,
or had received a dura mater graft.191 These policies for blood donation seem generally to have been im-
plemented in the United States by FDA.192 The report also recommended the vigorous enforcement of any
laws implemented to protect the food supply.193 The previous section indicates that FDA is attempting to
187See WHO Report 1997, supra note 15, at 1-12.
188See id. at 5.
189See id. at 6. These factors included the source of the materials and the BSE status of the country from which they are
imported, the type of material, the method used for collecting the materials, procedures to decrease infectivity of the material,
the amount of material, and the method used to administer the material. The report also recommended these procedures for
cosmetic manufacturers. See id. at 6-9.
190See id. 9-11.
191See id. at 10.
192See discussion supra Part V.A.
193See WHO Report 1997, supra note 15, at 11.
29do so in this country.
The actions of the United States have been called temperate when compared to those recommended by the
WHO.194 Comparing the actions of FDA with the recommendations of the WHO indicates that although
FDA initially may have been slow to implement changes at the time that the WHO recommended them, cur-
rent regulation in the U.S. appears to fulll the majority of the WHO's recommended policy. One may also
give FDA some leniency because they were trying to assess the particular needs of this country, which could
vary from those of other countries. Thus, the WHO recommendations merely serve as a guideline for what
the generally accepted ideas and appropriate action were at the time. However, the WHO recommendations
have been said to remove some of the doubt as to whether action is necessary and as to what action is nec-
essary.195 When the ruminant to ruminant feeding ban was suggested in the United States, a representative
of FDA said that they were \trying to both complement and expand [the WHO's] recommendation..."196
The only two major discrepancies seem to be the initial lag in suggesting that manufacturers of products
that use bovine materials | not just the manufacturers of dietary supplements | carefully select the origin
of their materials, and the amount of time that it took to consider and decide to implement a ruminant to
ruminant feed ban. However, FDA seems to have made up for the initial delay by recent actions, and perhaps
the initial delay will not result in any harm as there have not yet been any cases of BSE in the United States.
D.
Recent Petition
On January 7, 1999, the Humane Farming Association, Center for Food Safety (part of the International
194See 1996 Hearing 1, supra note 5, at 114 (statement of Frederick Murphy, School of Veterinary Medicine, Univ. of Calif.,
Davis).
195See id. at 124 (statement of Lester M. Crawford, DVM, Ph.D., Assoc. of Am. Veterinary Med. Colleges).
196Id. at 95 (statement of Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA).
30Center for Technology Assessment), the Center for Media and Democracy, and a number of victims or rel-
atives of victims of CJD led a petition with FDA requesting that FDA amend its nal rule to close some
loopholes that would allow TSE's to spread within the United States.197 This petition provides a fourth way
of assessing whether the actions of FDA were sucient to protect the American food supply from TSE's,
because it highlights issues about which the consuming public is concerned. I will discuss some of the criti-
cisms mentioned in the petition in this section.
1.
Blood and Blood Products
The petition requests that the rule be amended to prevent the feeding of blood and blood products to
animals.198 The U.S. regulation of its blood supply was discussed in Part V.A., so I will not elaborate on
the subject at length here, but this criticism goes beyond the protection of the blood supply to address
the addition of blood products to animal feed, especially for calves. As previously discussed, there is great
uncertainty about whether the infectious agent can actually be transmitted via blood. The nal rule exempts
blood from the denition of protein derived from mammalian tissues.199 Despite evidence that low levels of
the infectious agent may sometimes be present in blood,200 it has not been shown to transmit the disease and
has been considered safe in the WHO recommendations.201 Thus, this is a subject about which reasonable
people can dier in opinion. The petitioners view this as a risk that needs to be eliminated. However,
although some may think that a ban on using blood products for animal feed is necessary, as long as the
197See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
198See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
199See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30976 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
200See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 81 (Clarence J. Gibbs, Ph.D., NIH).
201See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 551, 561 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589.2000)
(proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
31blood is not contaminated from other, more dangerous, parts of the animal, FDA should not be denounced
for not having prohibited the use of blood products as well.
2.
Gelatin
Gelatin is also exempted from the denition of protein derived from mammalian tissues.202 The petition
requests that this exemption be removed so that gelatin is not fed to animals, especially considering that high
risk material can be introduced into the gelatin if whole bones, such as vertebrae are used to manufacture
it.203 In 1994, preliminary data that the gelatin industry presented to FDA was the basis for FDA's 1994
decision to exempt gelatin from its recommendations for products containing bovine ingredients from coun-
tries where BSE is present.204 Additionally, the WHO has declared that gelatin is safe as long as the source
materials are not contaminated with TSE's and the manufacturing process has been shown to eliminate or
inactivate any TSE infectivity.205 However, recently, the TSE Advisory Committee determined that current
information no longer warranted such an exemption.206 As a result, FDA issued a Level 1 guidance on which
it will be accepting comments but which will be implemented immediately due to the risk to public health.207
The guidance lists recommendations for choosing materials from which to make gelatin.208 This does not
address the use of gelatin in animal feed, though. However, the appendix to the guidance does state that
202See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30976 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
203See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
204See Guidance for Industry on the Sourcing and Processing of Gelatin to Reduce Potential Risk, 62 Fed. Reg. 52345
(1997)(notice of availability Oct. 7, 1997).
205See WHO Report 1997, supra note 15, at 7.
206See Guidance for Industry on the Sourcing and Processing of Gelatin to Reduce Potential Risk, 62 Fed. Reg. 52345
(1997)(notice of availability Oct. 7, 1997).
207See FDA, Guidance for Industry: The Sourcing and Processing of Gelatin to Reduce the Potential Risk Posed by
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in FDA-Regulated Products for Human Use, Sept. 1997, at 1, available in
<http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/industry/guidance/gelguide.htm>.
208See id. at 3-4.
32it is actually only domestic gelatin that is exempted from the rule because gelatin is not generally added to
animal feed as a protein supplement and bovine-derived products (including gelatin) that are imported from
countries where BSE is found are banned by USDA.209 Thus, FDA does not seem to be ignoring the possible
risk from gelatin and has revised its policy as it receives new scientic information about the substance.
3.
Pigs
Another area of controversy surrounds the fact that porcine meat was excluded from the nal rule because
pigs are often slaughtered at facilities that produce pure porcine material and have never been shown to
have a naturally occurring TSE.210 However, the nal rule does admit that there is some scientic evidence
suggesting that pigs can deliberately be infected with TSE.211 Experiments have shown that intracerebral
inoculation can transmit BSE to pigs, but it is not known whether the disease can be transmitted orally.212
Despite this evidence, the WHO considers the risk of transmitting a TSE through food from pigs to be neg-
ligible.213 The Consumer's Union also has criticized the nal rule for failing to include pigs in the prohibited
material.214 There has even been one instance of a veterinarian who reports having examined pigs with
symptoms matching those of a TSE in the 1970s.215 Concern arises about the idea that if such a TSE does
exist in pigs or can be transmitted to them, the nal rule would not prevent amplication of the disease
through the recycling of pig protein to ruminant animals through feed. This seems to be an area in which
209See id. at 5.
210See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30943-44 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589); See CVM, A Report on the Questions Asked and Answered on the Air During the June 24 BSE Satellite Teleconference
30 <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/TOCs/bsetrans.html>.
211See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. at 30939.
212See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 82-83 (Clarence J. Gibbs, Ph.D., NIH).
213See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United Kingdom: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting, 71 Bull. of the
World Health Org. 691, 694 (1993).
214See Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, Mad Cow U.S.A. 216 (1997).
215See id. at 212-15.
33further investigation is necessary. If it is possible to transmit BSE to pigs intracerebrally, it might be possible
to do so orally, and the petitioners could have a viable claim in their request that protein derived from pigs
should be excluded from animal feed. This area could theoretically present a large loophole in the regulation.
4.
No part of any animal having a TSE
Because of the fact that the presence of one animal infected with a TSE can amplify the disease if that
animal is rendered and introduced into animal feed, the petitioners also request that no part of an animal
that is showing signs of a TSE be allowed in animal feed and that this material be prohibited from fertilizer,
cosmetics, and other products as well.216 This suggestion is more of a general prophylactic rule to prevent
any TSE from entering the food chain (as recommended by the WHO).217 It is dicult to assess whether
this criticism indicates that FDA has not adequately performed its job because it is based more on theory
and conjecture than on proven science. However, the National Pork Producers Council commented that
they would support a rule prohibiting the introduction of any species known to have a TSE into livestock
feed.218 Due to the fact that the species barriers between TSE's are unpredictable, it seems logical that
animals that are suspected of having TSE and all tissues derived from them, whether they are exempted
from the regulation or not, should not be allowed to enter the food chain. When an animal is suspected of
having the disease, this should increase the risk and alert us to use extra caution. This amendment to the
rule requests that we err on the side of safety in these cases.
216See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
217See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
218See Public Meeting 2, supra note 2, at 47.
345.
Recordkeeping
Petitioners also want to extend the length of time that records must be kept from one year to ten years
because animals will not show signs of a TSE during a one year time period and because keeping the records
for a longer period of time will establish a method for determining the origin of contaminated material.219
FDA actually decreased the recordkeeping requirement from two years to one year.220 However, the pe-
titioner's request seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the reasons for which FDA is requiring the
records. Records will be used during inspection and to trace animal feed backwards and forwards through the
distribution chain in order to insure that prohibited material is not being fed to the wrong animals.221 The
records could also be used to notify customers if a problem is found, but there is not much practical value to
requiring that the records be kept for a longer period of time because the long and often unknown incubation
period for the disease would make it dicult to determine its source.222 Thus, it seems that determining the
source of contamination years later will be almost impossible because the period of infection cannot even be
pinpointed exactly. The records are being used for the more immediate purposes of facilitating inspection
to document compliance with the rule. Thus, although dierence of opinion obviously exists on this matter,
this does not seem to be an area where FDA is not accomplishing its goals of protecting the food supply.
E.
Other Possible Concerns
219See FDA Petition, supra note 1.
220See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30955 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
221See CVM, A Report on the Questions Asked and Answered on the Air During the June 24 BSE Satellite Teleconference 9,
14 <http://www.fda.gov/cvm/fda/TOCs/bsetrans.html>.
222See id. at 31.
35There are numerous other areas about which people are concerned because they fear that BSE or another
TSE could inltrate our food chain. Concerns about medical products were discussed in Part V.C. because
the WHO has made recommendations on this issue. Additionally, FDA has recently issued a guidance on
this issue, which contains recommendations for the manufacturers of medical products derived from both
bovine and other sources and suggests areas in which FDA is considering implementing other changes as
well.223 This is another guidance about which FDA is accepting comments but which it is implementing
immediately due to concerns about the public health.
People have also expressed concern about milk products, but, as mentioned above, numerous institutions
have suggested that milk products are safe. In fact, scientists were not able to detect any infectivity in
the milk of nursing mothers who had kuru or in mammary gland tissues or milk from cattle that had been
diagnosed with BSE.224
One nal concern, although there are numerous others that could be listed, is tallow. One comment to the
nal rule suggested that the proposed rule really did not take any action because it still allowed the use of
tallow in ruminant feed.225 Tallow is excluded from the nal rule because it is not a proteinaceous material,
and FDA notes that infectivity studies suggest that these are low risk materials.226 However, if there is risk
involved, perhaps the exclusion is not warranted. This is another topic of debate.
VI. Conclusion
223See FDA, Guidance for FDA Reviewers and Industry: Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources
(Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices), Nov. 6, 1998.
224See 1997 Hearing, supra note 3, at 82 (Clarence J. Gibbs, Ph.D., NIH).
225See Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed (Final Rule), 62 Fed. Reg. 30936, 30944-45 (1997) (codied at 21 C.F.R.
589).
226See id. at 30938.
36Perceptions about the signicance of mad cow disease range from comforting reassurances that our food
supply is safe and that there has never been a case of BSE found in the United States to the apocalyptic
image conveyed by Carleton Gajdusek, which ends with a statement that sums up the issue for each question
that is raised: \That hasn't been excluded either."227 In front of the British Parliament, Richard Lacey
said that merely reassuring the public by monitoring the incidence of CJD is a huge experiment and that
he could not believe that a scientist would say \In order to nd out how big the problem is we are going to
see how many people die."228 The questions that always arise are whether to act or not and whether to act
now or later.
I compared FDA's actions with the lessons that it should have learned from previous mistakes in order to
determine whether improvement has been made, with its own goals for enforcement in order to assess how
well it is achieving results from the actions that it decided to take and whether there are aws in the rule,
with the WHO guidelines in order to consider whether FDA acted in a manner reasonable given the general
scientic and political opinion of the situation at the time, and with a recent petition to FDA in order
to consider whether the general public thinks that FDA's actions were stringent enough. With the major
exception of failing to consider or implement a ban on feeding specied oals to ruminants until the posited
link between BSE and nv-CJD was announced in 1996, all of these assessments lead to the conclusion that
FDA acted reasonably and eciently to protect the American food supply.
Of course, it will not be possible to determine if this is true or not until it may be too late. There is no way
to know what amount of action is sucient. But given all of these methods of assessment, at the very least
one can say that FDA's actions seem reasonable in the given circumstances. One can always ask why they
didn't do more or didn't do something faster, but FDA appears to have generally acted with sucient speed
to protect the American public. Of course, it is easier to make that assertion since BSE did not spread to or
227Richard Rhodes, Deadly Feasts 220-21 (1997).
228Id. at 187 (1997).
37occur in the United States during the period in which FDA may not have acted as quickly as it could have.
One can only hope that analysis of the relevant indications led FDA to act as it did and that if the situation
was dierent | BSE was going to be found in this country | that there would have been indications that
would have led FDA to act dierently.
Ho
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